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The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with
New Firepower Is Aimed at
Health Care Fraud
David J. Ryan*
INTRODUCrION

Once a figure of the Old West, the bounty hunter has appeared on the horizon in the fight against health care fraud.
Armed with the False Claims Act (FCA),1 today's bounty
hunter seeks out instances of fraud against Medicare and other
federal programs. Although vast differences exist between the
frontier bounty hunters and their modem medical counterparts,
they share a common bond. Like the bounty hunter, the health
care fraud hunter is a private citizen who fights alleged wrongdoing with the promise of a government-sponsored reward if
successful. Also, as on the frontier, justice under the FCA is
often rough, and constitutional protections are sometimes
ignored.
This article will outline the history of the FCA, summarize its
major provisions, explore whether certain aspects of the FCA
run afoul of constitutional guarantees, and examine recent developments in the expansion of the use of the Act.
Despite the superficial similarity, the origin of today's health
care fraud hunter is not found in the 19th century American
frontier, but in the England of centuries earlier. There, the "qui
tam" doctrine was developed to allow informers to expose fraud
against the Crown and to collect a share of the proceeds recovered. 2 The doctrine was adopted in England's colonies and, after independence, the First Congress of the United States
* David J. Ryan practices law in the Chicago area. He was a partner at the Chicago litigation law firm of Williams & Montgomery. He received his Bachelor of Arts
from Northwestern University, his Juris Doctor from Georgetown University, and his
Master of Laws in Health Law from Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
2. The term is derived from the phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac partesequitur," meaning "he who brings the action for the king as well as
for himself." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND,
BOOK III, 160 (1768).
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included qui tam provisions in a number of laws concerning import duties and trade. 3
The tradition was continued during the Civil War, when the
Union Army found itself defrauded by defense contractors.4 In
response, the False Claims Act was adopted in 1863. Among
other things, this Act contained provisions for civil penalties for
fraud against the government, including double damages. The
Act also allowed private individuals to prosecute those who submitted false claims to the United States, and successful individuals could receive one-half of the amount recovered. This law,
which has been amended several times and recodified since its
enactment, is the ancestor of today's FCA.
The reach of the qui tam provisions of the FCA has followed
an erratic pattern over the years, expanding, contracting, and
then expanding again. This is especially true with regard to the
question of who may bring a qui tam action on behalf of the
government. Such a person is commonly referred to as a "qui
tam plaintiff" or a "relator." The terms are used interchangeably. The position of a qui tam plaintiff can be an enviable one,
given the potential rewards. An important issue concerns the
degree to which the relator's information is instrumental to the
case, earning the relator a share of the recovery.
Initially, the requirements for relators were quite lax. They
did not have to bring any new information and, in fact, could
rely solely on information already in the hands of the government. Such "parasitic" actions probably reached their zenith in
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,6 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a relator could bring a qui tam action,
even if all of the relator's information came from the government's own investigation. In fact, in Hess, the plaintiff's complaint was substantially the same as the criminal indictment.
3. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp.
1084, 1086 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat.
199, 209 (1791); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 55, 69, 1 Stat. 145, 173, 177 (1790); Act
of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137, 137-38 (1790); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2,
1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (1790); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1 Stat. 55, 60 (1789); Act
of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 29, 38, 1 Stat. 29, 44-45, 48 (1789)).
4. Among the woes described were Colt revolvers being sold to the government

for $25 when they were selling on the open market for $14.50. United States ex reL
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
1989).

5. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863).
6.

317 U.S. 537, 545 (1943).
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Congress reacted swiftly to what it viewed as a perversion of
the FCA and moved to stop opportunists from taking advantage
of the Act when they contributed nothing original. Congress
amended the Act to bar all qui tam actions that were based on
any information already in the hands of the government.7
However, this amendment proved to be overly restrictive, especially when the letter of the law was applied while its spirit
was ignored. This was amply demonstrated in a 1984 decision of
the Seventh Circuit, wherein the State of Wisconsin attempted
to bring a qui tam action against a psychiatrist who had engaged
in Medicaid fraud. However, the court held that the qui tam
action was barred because it was based on information already
in the hands of the United States. The irony was that the information had been given to the United States by the State of Wisconsin. Therefore, a strict interpretation of the 1943 provision
required the dismissal of the State of Wisconsin's qui tam action,
even though the state was the originator of the information and
the information was essential to the prosecution of the
psychiatrist.
This absurd result led to further amendments of the FCA in
1986, as Congress attempted to encourage qui tam actions while
avoiding the problem of rewarding opportunists. The amendments reduced the plaintiff's burden of proof, lowered standards for showing intent and knowledge, and significantly raised
penalties and damages. The current law, which includes the recent amendments, will be discussed in more detail below.
It seems clear that the amendments have had their intended
effect of expanding the use of the FCA and its qui tam provisions. As the recent amendments have made it easier to pursue
fraud actions, qui tam suits have increased and received greater
publicity, leading to greater awareness of the law and, in turn, to
the filing of still more actions.
In fiscal year 1994, the United States recovered $1.09 billion
in all types of civil fraud cases. Over one-third of this amount$411 million-was from health care providers. Of the $1.09 billion recovered in all civil fraud cases, $378 million was obtained

7. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (originally codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 232(c) (1943)).
8. United States ex rel. Wis. v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
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through qui tam actions brought by private citizens-twice the
amount recovered in the previous fiscal year. 9
Such an upsurge may partially be explained by some wellpublicized rewards to relators, especially the $15 million received by the qui tam plaintiff as his share of the government's
$111.4 million recovery against National Health Laboratories.' °
As if that were not enough, the issue of health care fraud has
even found its way into popular entertainment. As pointed out
by Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), "[a]t HCFA we attribute increasing symbolic importance to the fact that the bad guys in what's
probably the best movie of this past summer, 'The Fugitive,'
were really health care providers ...

trying to put one over on

the American public."' 1
This article will review the FCA, identify potential relators,
and discuss constitutional challenges to its provisions. It will
then explore whether the Act's amendments may be applied retroactively. The article will then focus on the use of qui tam actions in the health care area and conclude with a brief prediction
of their prospects in a managed care environment.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE

ACr

Under the False Claims Act, a defendant is liable for knowingly presenting to the United States government any false or
fraudulent claim for payment. False records or false statements
submitted to support a claim are themselves false claims. Conspiracy to make such a false claim is also forbidden, as is causing
another person to present a false claim.12
The definitions of "knowing" and "knowingly" are quite
broad. They include actual knowledge of the information as
well as deliberate ignorance of or reckless disregard for the
of the information. No specific intent to defraud
truth or falsity
13
is required.
9. Josh Chetwynd, Recoveries by U.S. from Civil FraudSurged in Fiscal '94, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 12, 1994, at B3.
10. Richard B. Schmitt, Whistles Blow More Often on Health Care, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 2, 1993, at B1.
11. Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator of HCFA, Remarks at the National Health
Lawyers Association Conference, Fraud & Abuse, Sept. 27, 1993 (reported in

1993, at 5).
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
13. Id. § 3729(b) (1988). These broad definitions were made a part of the 1986
amendments to clarify prior law and to avoid decisions such as United States v.
HEALTH LAW. NEWS REP., Oct.
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A "claim" includes any request for money or property made
to the government, as well as any nongovernmental third party,
if the United States government provides any portion of the
money or property that is 4requested, or if the government will
reimburse the third party.'
The penalties for submitting a false claim are harsh: a civil
penalty of $5,000 to $10,000 per false statement, plus three times
the amount of actual damages sustained by the government,
plus costs. However, a person who submits a false claim but
brings it to the government's attention within 30 days of the perpenalty reduced to
son's discovery of the violation may have1 the
5
costs.
plus
damages
actual
the
times
two
The section dealing with civil actions under the FCA opens
with a paragraph charging the United States Attorney General
with responsibility for investigating violations and filing civil actions.' 6 However, the rest of the section outlines the procedures
is brought by a private person on
to be followed when an action
17
government.
the
of
behalf
A qui tam plaintiff first prepares a written complaint and
serves it on the Attorney General, not on the defendant, along
with written documentation of substantially all material evidence. The complaint is filed in camera, remaining under seal
for at least 60 days, during which time the government is to review the case.18 However, the government may move to extend
the 60-day period for good cause while continuing to review the
matter. Multiple extensions may be given. During this time, the
Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1962), which required actual knowledge. See THE
FALSE CLAIMS REFORM Acr OF 1985, S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, at 7

(1986) [hereinafter

REPORT].

14. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (1988).
15. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The 1986 amendments increased these penalties from
$2,000 per false statement, and trebled, rather than doubled, damages. See REPORT,

supra note 13, at 17.
16.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).

17. Id. § 3730(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
18. Id. § 3730(b)(2). With regard to documentation, courts are inclined to interpret the phrase "substantially all" evidence rather liberally, as long as the government

is given sufficient notice of the nature of the fraud and of the evidence. See United
States ex reL Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., Inc., 797 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986).

However, the allegations of fraud contained in the complaint must be pled with particularity, or the complaint may be dismissed without prejudice, see, e.g., United
States ex reL Mikes v. Straus, 853 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), or with prejudice if
the pleading defects are not corrected. See, e.g., United States ex ret Stinson, Lyons,
Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., 755 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ga.

1990).
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complaint is still under seal, and the defendant may be completely unaware of the filing of the action. 19
After reviewing the case, the government must decide
whether to proceed with the action or to decline to do so. If it
proceeds with the action, then the government takes over the
handling of the case. If the government declines the case, it so
notifies the court, and the qui tam plaintiff then has the right to
handle the case individually. 20 However, once a qui tam action
has been initiated with the filing of the sealed complaint, no one
other than the government or the original relator can intervene
or bring any case based on the facts of the original action. In
the first case
other words, no copy cat suits are allowed, 2and
1
filed bars all others based on the same facts.
If the government proceeds with the action, it retains the primary responsibility for prosecuting the case. Although the qui
tam plaintiff has the right to continue as a party, the private
plaintiff's role may be limited. Specifically, upon motion of the
government, the relator's participation may be restricted,22 and
the case may be settled 23 or even dismissed 24 over the objections
of the relator. The government may also choose to proceed with
the action in an alternate forum, such as an administrative proceeding; the relator has the same rights in such an alternate forum as in a regular civil action.25
If the government decides not to handle the case, the relator
has the right to conduct the action, although the government
may ask to be served with copies of pleadings and deposition
transcripts. Also, the government may intervene at a later time,
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
20. Id. § 3730(b)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
21. Id. § 3730(b)(5) (1988 & Supp. 1993). Where the later-filed case alleges some
facts that are contained in the original case and others that are not, the overlapping
factual allegations will be stricken from the later-filed complaint, while original allegations will be allowed to stand. See, e.g., Erickson ex rel. United States v. American
Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va. 1989); Hyatt v. Northrop
Corp., No. CV 87-6892, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18941 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 1989).

22.

31 U.S.C. 88 3730(c)(2)(C), (D) (1988 & Supp. 1993).

23. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993). However, a relator may have the
right to conduct discovery in order to find out the elements of a settlement where the
relator has been excluded from negotiations. United States ex rel. McCoy v. California Medical Review, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Relators have been successful at challenging inadequate settlements between the government and

defendants. See, e.g., Gravitt v. General Elec. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ohio),
appeal dismissed, 848 F.2d 190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).

24. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
25. Id. § 3730(c)(5) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol4/iss1/8
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with leave of court, if the rights of the qui tam plaintiff are not
thereby limited.26 The government may also delay discovery in
the case if it can show that such discovery would interfere with
the government's investigation or prosecution of a criminal case
arising out of the same facts.27
Aside from the differences in procedures between cases handled by the government and cases that it declines, there are also
differences regarding the amount of the relator's award. If the
government proceeds with the case, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to an award in an amount from 15% to 25% of the proceeds
of the action or settlement. The court is to determine the percentage based upon the extent of the relator's substantial contribution to the prosecution. However, if the relator's information
has not been substantial and the prosecution has been based primarily on sources other than the relator, then the court may
award an appropriate percentage to the qui tam plaintiff, but no
more than 10% of the proceeds. The relator may also receive
reasonable expenses plus costs and attorneys' fees, all of which
are awarded against the defendant.28 If the government declines
to proceed with the action, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to a
reasonable award of not less than 25% and not more than 30%
of the proceeds, in addition to reasonable expenses, costs, and
attorneys' fees.29
If the relator participated in the violation of the False Claims
Act, then the court may take that fact into consideration in reducing the award to an appropriate percentage. Furthermore, if
the qui tam plaintiff is actually convicted of a crime relating to
the FCA violation, then no share of the proceeds shall be
awarded to that plaintiff. This is true whether or not the government decides to handle the case. If the government does take

26.

Id. § 3730(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993).

27. Id. § 3730(c)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
28. Id. § 3730(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993). The 1986 amendments increased the
bottom of the range from 10% to 15%. With regard to the second part of this provision, a court has awarded only 5% of the proceeds where it found that "the suit was
based primarily on disclosures, albeit not public, of specific information other than
information provided by the relators on their own." United States v. CAC-Ramsay,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd mem., 963 F.2d 384 (11th Cir.
1992).
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993). The 1986 amendments increased
the top of the range from 25% to 30% of the proceeds.
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although a convicted
the case, it may proceed with the action,
30
case.
the
from
dismissed
be
will
relator
Reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses may be awarded
against the qui tam plaintiff if the government does not take on
that the relator brought
the action and if the court determines
31
the action frivolously or vexatiously.
The law avoids the hazard of parasitic suits by prohibiting a
qui tam action in a case where the government has already sued
in a civil or administrative proceeding, 32 or where relevant information has been publicly disclosed.33
However, where the relator is the "original source" of the information, then a qui tam action may be brought, notwithstanding the public disclosure of the information. 34 This latter
provision would prevent relators who were original sources of
information from falling victim to the trap that snared the State
of Wisconsin. 35 An original source must have direct and independent knowledge of the information and must voluntarily
provide it to the government before filing a qui tam action.36
A False Claims Act suit requires the relator, on behalf of the
government, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all
essential elements of the case.37 An action is to be brought
within six years of the alleged violation of the FCA, or within
three years of the time that the government discovers the viola30. Id. § 3730(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993). This provision was added through the
Major Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-700, 102 Stat. 4638 (1988), to further refine
who may bring a qui tam action; truly culpable parties are not to be unjustly rewarded. An offshoot of this issue, which arises occasionally, is the question of
whether a defendant may file an indemnity or contribution counterclaim against an
allegedly culpable relator, so as to shift or allocate the liability for the FCA violations.
The question was answered in the negative in Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist.
Court of Nev., 934 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1991). It would seem that § 3730(d)(3) provides
the only remedy against relators with unclean hands: reduction of their share of the
proceeds. However, counterclaims based on issues unrelated to the FCA violations
may be permitted. United States ex rel. Madden v. General Dynamics Corp., 4 F.3d
827 (9th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Eng'g, 145 F.R.D. 452 (S.D.
Ohio 1992).
31. Id. § 3730(d)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
32. Id. § 3730(e)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
33. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
34. Id.
35. United States ex rel. Wis. v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
37. Id. § 3731(c) (1988). This clarifies the standard, which had sometimes been
held to be "clear and convincing." See United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310 (6th Cir.
1962).
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol4/iss1/8
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tion, whichever occurs later, but in no event more than ten years
after the violation was committed.38
II.

POTENTIAL RELATORS

Because of the requirement that information not be publicly
disclosed or, if it is, that the relator be the original source of the
information, it is easy to see why most qui tam plaintiffs have

been employed by or associated with the defendants. 39 Indeed,
one court has referred to the insider as "[t]he paradigmatic
'original source' .....
-10 Of course, even insiders are not always

able to come up with information that has not already been pub-

licly disclosed.4 '

Another potential source of relators is Medicare beneficiaries.
For example, in Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.,42 a Medicare beneficiary Cooper repeatedly quarreled
with Blue Cross and Blue Shield over its handling of certain bills

and its role as Medicare secondary payer. In moving to dismiss
the relator's qui tam action, Blue Cross and Blue Shield argued,

among other things, that the plaintiff's allegations were already
publicly disclosed in newspaper articles and in a similar action
against Blue Cross and Blue Shield in Georgia. The court held
that the particular violations that Cooper complained of had
been uncovered by him, so the case was allowed to proceed as a

qui tam action.
However, a law firm was held not to be an original source of
information when it uncovered alleged fraud while handling
civil discovery in unrelated litigation. The court held that the

law firm's knowledge actually came from an employee of an insurance company, rendering the firm's alleged knowledge
38. Id. § 3731(b) (1988). Some courts have held that the statute begins to run
when demand for payment is made. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 839 F. Supp. 92
(D.P.R. 1993). Other courts have held that actual payment starts the running of the
statute. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Duvall v. Scott Aviation, 733 F. Supp. 159
(W.D.N.Y. 1990).
39. See, e.g., United States ex reL McCoy v. California Medical Review, Inc., 133
F.R.D. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (former employees of defendant peer review organization); United States ex rel. Davis v. Long's Drugs, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Cal.
1976) (former employee of defendant pharmacies).
40. United States ex reL Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1161 (3d Cir. 1991).
41. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., No.
Civ-92-2192-B, 1994 WL 746694 (W.D. Okla. July 18, 1994), in which a former clinical
director of a day-treatment facility was held not to be an original source of information that was already in the hands of the government.
42. 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir. 1994).
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secondhand. For that reason, the law firm could not be an original source.43
A number of courts have addressed the issue of whether cur-

rent or former government employees are proper qui tam plaintiffs. Most courts have looked at the broad congressional intent
and have found such parties to be proper relators.44 On the

other hand, some decisions have held that, because it is the duty
of government employees to uncover and report fraud, the disclosure of such information could not be considered "voluntary." Also, any information that was known to a government
employee could be deemed to have been publicly disclosed.45

Competitors of the defendant could be another fertile source
of qui tam plaintiffs. In fact, the relator who collected the $15
million share of the National Health Laboratories settlement
was a salesman employed by a competing laboratory.46

Although public interest organizations have pursued qui tam
actions as relators,4 7 great care must be exercised in forming

such an organization for the purpose of being a qui tam plaintiff.
Such an organization may have difficulty showing that it was the
original source of the information and that it had direct and in-

dependent knowledge of the allegations.48
Also, in United States ex rel. FederalRecovery Services, Inc. v.
Crescent City E.M.S., Inc.,4 9 an individual who uncovered alleged false claims made by an ambulance service informed the
43. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160-61.
44. See United States ex rel Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., 39 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1994)
(former Inspector General auditor); United States ex reL Williams v. NEC Corp., 931
F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991) (Air Force attorney who conducted investigation); United
States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1991)
(government attorney); United States ex rel. McDowell v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
755 F. Supp. 1038 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (Air Force contract cost analyst); United States ex
reL Givler v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (former Housing Authority Commissioner); United States v. CAC-Ramsey, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
aff'd mem., 963 F.2d 384 (11th Cir. 1992) (retired employee of Department of Health
and Human Services who learned of Medicare fraud while performing a government
audit); Erickson ex reL United States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D. Va. 1989) (employee of Agency for International Development).
45. See United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991) (former Defense Department quality assurance
representative).
46. Schmitt, supra note 10.
47. See, e.g., United States ex reL Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Singer Co., 889 F.2d
1327 (4th Cir. 1989).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Colo.
1990).
49. No. Civ. A. No. 91-4150, 1993 WL 345655 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1993).
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government and the news media of the allegations. After the
information was made public, the individual and his attorney
formed a corporation, Federal Recovery Services, to act as the
qui tam plaintiff. The court held that Federal Recovery Services
was not a proper plaintiff since all of the relevant information
was publicly disclosed before it even came into existence. The
court further held that the individual who uncovered the information could not be added as a qui tam plaintiff even though he
was the original source of the information because the Act prohibits intervention by any person other than the United States
government. Although both the individual and Federal Recovery Services were dismissed as relators, the case continued with
the United States as the plaintiff. Clearly, despite the qui tam
doctrine's liberal application in many cases, technical requirements must still be observed.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FALSE CLAIMS Acr PROVISIONS
Defendants in several cases 50 have launched broad attacks on
the constitutionality of several provisions of the False Claims
Act.
A.

Separation of Powers

Some defendants have contended that the qui tam provisions
violate the doctrine of separation of powers because they constitute a legislative encroachment on the executive power of prosecution.-' However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected this argument in United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp.,52 pointing out that Congress
was furthering its legislative functions by employing the qui tam
provisions rather than intruding on the powers of the Executive
Branch. In United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters,
Inc., a California district court pointed to the long history of qui
tam statutes, including the many statutes that were passed with
50. United States ex ret Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994); United States ex rel Kreindler & Kreindler v. United
Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962 (1993);
United States ex rel Burch v. Piqua Eng'g, 145 F.R.D. 452 (S.D. Ohio 1992); United
States by Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev. ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 775 F. Supp. 172
(E.D. Pa. 1991); United States ex rel Truong v. Northrup Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615
(C.D. Cal. 1989); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
722 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Cal. 1989); United States ex rel. Stillwel v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
52. 985 F.2d 1148, 1155.
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such provisions by the First Congress, as " 'contemporaneous
with the
and weighty evidence' that the concept is consistent
'53
powers.
of
separation
of
principle
constitutional
B. Appointments Clause
A related argument concerns the appointments clause, 4
which gives the President the power to appoint inferior officers
of the United States. Defendants often rely on the Supreme
Court case of Buckley v. Valeo,55 wherein the Election Commission appointed by Congress was declared invalid. However, the
courts have held that since Congress has no power to control the
actions of qui tam plaintiffs and they are not actually appointed
by Congress, the Buckley reasoning does not apply.56
C. Standing
The third broad-based constitutional challenge to the qui tam
provisions concerns the relator's lack of standing to bring the
case. Defendants argue that qui tam plaintiffs are not bringing
an action on their own behalf, so there is no real case or controversy at issue.57
Some courts have addressed this issue by looking to the delegation of authority from the United States to the qui tam plaintiff. In those cases, 58 the courts have held that there is an actual
case or controversy between the United States and the defendant, and the qui tam plaintiff is simply bringing the action on
behalf of the United States. Other courts have had an alternative view, finding a case or controversy between the relator and
the defendant either because the relator has a stake in the recovery of the proceeds 9 or because the relator frequently risks
unemployment or other hardships in bringing the case.6 °
The former appears to be the better-reasoned view. Qui tam
cases are brought on behalf of the United States, and there is
certainly a case or controversy between the government and the
defendant since government money is alleged to have been
falsely obtained. The fact that the relator may share in the
53. 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (citation omitted).
54.
55.

U.S. CoNsT. art II, § 2, cl.2.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).

56.
57.
58.
59.

See, e.g., Kelly, 9 F.3d 743, 757-59.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
See, e.g., Kelly, 9 F.3d at 748; Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 619.
Stillwell, 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1098-99.

60.

See Burch, 145 F.R.D. 452, 454.
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award does not create a controversy between the relator and the
defendant because the relator suffered no actual injury. Moreover, aside from employees of the defendant, qui tam plaintiffs
do not necessarily risk much by bringing a suit, and, in the case
of competitors, they may actually benefit, regardless of the outcome. Finally, one court held that the Eleventh Amendment 6
does not bar a citizen of one state from filing a qui tam action
against an agency of another state because the real party in interest is not the relator, but the United States. 62 This lends support to the argument that it is the government that has standing
to bring the suit, while the relator simply represents the
government.
In summary, these wide-ranging attacks on the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions have been uniformly unsuccessful
in the circuit and district courts. This is not difficult to understand. Although onerous to those defendants who would not
otherwise have been prosecuted, qui tam actions brought under
the FCA's provisions do not appear to put defendants in any
worse position than they would be in had the government decided to prosecute them at the outset. Indeed, in those cases
where the government takes over the case, the defendants are
being prosecuted by the government, and the role of the relator
is often quite limited. Where the government declines to handle
the case, the defendant may be better off, depending on the
quality of the counsel for the qui tam plaintiff. If the charges are
found to be baseless and the suit frivolous, sanctions may be
awarded against the qui tam plaintiff. 63 In short, the qui tam
provisions, taken by themselves, do not seem to present glaring
problems of unfairness.
However, this is not true of some of the other provisions of
the FCA, particularly those dealing with the damages to be assessed against the defendant. Those provisions present serious
constitutional issues.
D. Double Jeopardy
One of the most fundamental constitutional guarantees is the
right to be free from being put in double jeopardy for the same
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
62. United States ex reL Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr.,
961 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1992).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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offense. 64 Parallel criminal proceedings are often brought along
with a civil FCA suit, creating double jeopardy problems. This
issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Halper.65 In that case, the Supreme Court held that, while the
FCA is a remedial statute, it can become a punitive statute if the
civil penalties are grossly disproportionate to the harm suffered
by the United States. In other words, as long as the civil penalties bear some relationship to the loss, the prosecution of the
FCA action will not constitute double jeopardy when there is
also a criminal prosecution. However, if the civil penalty bears
no rational relationship to the loss, then it can only be interpreted as a punishment, so the double jeopardy prohibition
would apply. In Halper, the Supreme Court decided that
$130,000 in penalties was so excessive, compared with an actual
loss of $585, that the civil penalties would be considered a second punishment for double jeopardy purposes.66 In Halper, the
defendant had already been imprisoned for the same violations
alleged in the civil action.
Although Halper seems to hold out hope to defendants, unfortunately no other defendants have been able to convince a
court that the Halper rule applied to their cases. For example, in
United States v. Pani,6 7 the double jeopardy argument was unsuccessful in a FCA civil action against a physician. The court
held that a civil penalty of $32,460 was not so disproportionate
to the actual damages of $1,280 as to raise a question of double
jeopardy. 6s This troubling result shows the rather disingenuous
position the courts have taken. Can it honestly be said that a
civil penalty 25 times the amount of actual damages is intended
only as compensation for loss and not as a punishment? Clearly
what is involved here is punishment, whether the multiple is 25
times, as in Pani, or 222 times, as in Halper.
This problem has been made even more acute by the recent
amendments, which have increased penalties from $2,000 per violation to between $5,000 and $10,000 per violation, as well as
trebling actual damages. The potential for astronomical civil
penalties and damages leaves no doubt about the punitive nature of these provisions, and defendants who are subject to crim64.
65.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).

66. Id. at 450-52.
67.
68.

717 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 1019.
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inal prosecution should continue to oppose civil penalties on
double jeopardy grounds.
E.

Excessive Fines

A related argument concerns the constitutional prohibition on
excessive fines.69 In Peterson v. Weinberger,7 ° the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the district court's finding that a civil
penalty of $2,000 for each of 120 false claims would be unreasonable and disproportionate to the loss sustained by the government. This decision was later cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in Halper.7 1 Therefore, in addition to the Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy argument, defendants may also
have an Eighth Amendment excessive fines argument. This argument is based on the same reasoning: the civil penalties are so
excessive they serve not as compensation to the government or
as a remedy for the loss but as a quasi-criminal punishment.
Defendants should also be encouraged by dicta from the
Supreme Court in Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal,Inc.72 In that case, the court held that the exces-

sive fines clause did not prevent the award of punitive damages
in cases between private parties, but it specifically left open the
issue of whether the clause would affect qui tam actions. Given
that the real party in interest is the government, it seems that
the excessive fines clause should apply to qui tam actions, at
least in those cases where the civil penalties are truly excessive.
However, it is likely that the excessive fines argument would
be subject to the same scrutiny as the double jeopardy argument, and that only in the most extreme cases would the defendant have any chance of success.

IV.

RETROAcTIVITY

As discussed in section I above, the recent amendments to the
False Claims Act expanded the reach of the Act. Although
passed with the admirable purpose of preventing fraud, retroactive application of several of these amendments can cause injustice to defendants. In particular, retroactive expansion of the
definition of knowledge of falsity to include "deliberate igno69.
70.
71.
72.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
508 F.2d 45, 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
490 U.S. 435, 450.
492 U.S. 257, 275-76 n.21 (1989).
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rance" of truth or falsity, 73 and the significant change in civil
penalties, 74 increases the defendant's liability for acts that occurred before the law was changed. Unfortunately for defendants, it appears that the bulk of the district courts that have
addressed this issue have approved of the retroactive application of the amendments.75
Some of these cases are based on the 1974 United States
Supreme Court decision in Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,7 6 which retroactively applied a new provision authorizing

an award of attorneys' fees in a school desegregation case. The
Supreme Court stated that courts must "apply the law in effect
at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in
manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative
history to the contrary. ' 77 In other words, the Court indicated a
presumption in favor of retroactivity unless the language of the
statute dictates otherwise.
However, 14 years later, in Bowen v. Georgetown University
7 8 the Court appeared to take a very different direction.
Hospital,

In that case, the Court indicated that the presumption is against
retroactivity unless required by the language of the legislation.79
Significantly, the only circuit court to have directly ruled on
the retroactive application of the FCA amendments rejected
such application. In United States v. Murphy,8 ° the Sixth Circuit
reviewed Bradley and Bowen, as well as Bennett v. New Jersey,8

a Supreme Court decision that somewhat weakened the principle announced in Bradley by stating that statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only
prospective effect. 82 The Court decided that Bennett and Bowen
represented the better and latest thinking of the Supreme Court
on this issue.
73.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1988).

74. Id. § 3729(a) (1988).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Colo.
1990); United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States ex rel.
McCoy v. California Medical Review, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1989); United
States v. Oakwood Downriver Medical Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
76. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
77. Id. at 711.
78. 488 U.S.-204 (1988).
79. Id. at 224.
80. 937 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1991).
81. 470 U.S. 632 (1985).

82.

Id. at 639.
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Looking specifically at the Act, the Murphy court held that
applying the amendment's looser definition of "knowingly"
would include conduct that the court would not have previously
viewed as criminal.83 Also, the court noted that under the
amendments, the liability of an individual would increase by
more than a million dollars, thus creating a new liability in connection with a past transaction.8 Accordingly, the court refused
to apply the amendments retroactively.
Defendants can also point to a recent Supreme Court decision, Landgrafv. USI Film Products, which dealt with the compensatory and punitive damages provided for in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act.85 The Court did not reject Bradley, but noted that
the decision concerned attorneys' fees, which the Court deemed
to be collateral to the main issues. However, the Court held
that provisions dealing with both compensatory and punitive
damages dealt with substantive rights, and that these could not
be applied retroactively. 86 This case should be a boon to defendants arguing against retroactive application of the FCA
amendments.
However, two events would ultimately clear up the controversy over retroactive application of amendments. One would
be Congress' passage of yet another amendment explicitly indicating whether the recent amendments are to be applied retroactively or prospectively. The other would be the simple
passage of time such that most suits would be brought for activities occurring after the enactment of the amendments, thus rendering the issue moot.
V.

FALSE CLAIMS: EXPANDING HORIZONS

In addition to facing simultaneous criminal and civil prosecution, enormous civil penalties and damages, and possible retroactive application of the law, potential False Claims Act
defendants in the health care arena must now look forward to
qui tam and government-initiated actions based not on specific
false claims, but on alleged problems with the structure of their
business arrangements. In the past, the typical false claim in83.
84.
85.
86.

937 F.2d at 1036.
Id. at 1038.
114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
Id. at 1505-06.
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volved such alleged practices as using false diagnostic codes,8 7
ordering unnecessary tests,88 seeking payment for services not
rendered, 89 or falsely characterizing nonreimbursable routine
examinations as reimbursable consultationsf 0 In such cases, the
presence of a false claim is obvious, since the defendants submit
false information in order to receive payment from the United
States. However, recent developments have pointed toward a
trend in applying the FCA to seek damages and civil penalties
for violations of the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback
statute.9 1
A.

Kickback Schemes

Among other things, the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback law forbids any "remuneration" in return for referrals in
connection with any service that may be paid for by Medicare or
Medicaid. 92 Although it has been held that the anti-kickback
law itself does not create a private remedy,93 the government
and qui tam plaintiffs have sought to bring suits based on violations of the anti-kickback law in the guise of false claims actions.
The seeds of these developments were planted over 50 years
ago in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,9 4 when the Supreme
Court held that claims submitted pursuant to a government contract entered into as a result of collusive bidding or bribery were
subject to the FCA. Likewise, the FCA was applied by the Second Circuit over 20 years ago to a case involving a government
contract for construction of ship boilers, where it was alleged
that the contract negotiations were based on inflated cost estimates submitted by the defendants. The court held that the invoices submitted pursuant to the contract were false claims.95
Given these early applications of the FCA to "tainted negotiation" cases, it is surprising that reported decisions using similar
theories in the area of health care fraud occurred only within the
last few years. For example, United States ex rel Woodard v.
87. United States ex reL Wagner v. Allied Clinical Labs., No. C-1-94-92 (S.D.
Ohio filed Feb. 7, 1994, unsealed July 25, 1994).
88. United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986).
89. United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
90. United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988).
92. Id.
93. See West Allis Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1988).
94. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
95. United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 447 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Country View Care Center, Inc.96 was a qui tam action filed by

the State of Colorado asserting Medicaid fraud. The state alleged that the defendants submitted false claims when they filed
cost reports that included amounts of money paid to certain
"consultants." The trial court found that the consultants performed no services and the payments were actually kickbacks.97
Since the defendants' reimbursement was based on the cost reports, submission of these reports constituted false claims. The
judgment against the defendants was affirmed on appeal.98
By itself, Woodard does not appear to be a remarkable result.
After all, specific documents containing false statements were
submitted to the government. Moreover, because the payments
paid to the "consultants" were deemed to be worthless, it was
possible to calculate actual damages based on those payments
and to assess specific penalties for each submission of an inflated cost report.
In United States v. Kensington Hospital,99 the trial court al-

lowed the application of the FCA to an alleged kickback situation. In this case, the defendants argued that the Act did not
apply because the government could not have suffered any loss
due to the kickbacks since the defendants' reimbursement was
already fixed under Medicaid and would not have been affected
by the cost of the kickbacks. The court held, citing Marcus,"°
that the government did not need to show any actual damages to
prove an FCA violation. 10 1 The court also rejected the use of
the general Anti-Kickback Act of 1986,102 holding that Congress

intended that act to apply only to contractor-subcontractor situ10 3
ations, not to kickbacks in the Medicare or Medicaid context.
Although the plaintiffs in both Woodard and Kensington Hospital alleged facts showing the defendants participating in kickbacks, the specific anti-kickback law pertaining to Medicare and
Medicaid was not the basis for FCA liability in either case.
However, in the recent decision of United States ex rel. Roy v.

Anthony, 1°4 the district court refused to dismiss a qui tam FCA
96.
97.

797 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 891.

98.

Id. at 894.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

760 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
317 U.S. 537 (1943).
760 F. Supp. at 1127.
41 U.S.C. §§ 51-58 (1988).
760 F. Supp. at 1139.
No. C-1-93-0559, 1994 WL 376271 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 1994).
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suit expressly brought for violations of the Medicare/Medicaid
anti-kickback law. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the defendant received payments for patient referrals. The court noted
that the plaintiff was alleging "activity that is clearly illegal, but
it is not so clearly a violation of the False Claims Act.' 10 5 Nevertheless, the court felt that it was possible that the plaintiff could
establish that the alleged kickbacks "somehow tainted the
claims for Medicare."' 1 6 Since this case is still pending, it remains to be seen whether the qui tam plaintiff will be able to
muster proof sufficient to support an FCA case. However, the
idea of basing FCA suits on violations of the Medicare anti-kick10 7
back law seems to be gaining acceptance.
The use of the anti-kickback statute in support of FCA suits
received another boost recently with the consent judgment entered in United States v. 2 Medical, Inc.10 8 In this case, it was
alleged that T2 , a home infusion company, helped doctors set up
infusion centers. When enou[h doctors were referring a stream
of patients to the centers, T would buy the centers from the
doctors, giving them T 2 stock in exchange for the doctors' shares
in the centers. However, the doctors were restricted in selling
their T 2 stock, and they allegedly had an illicit incentive to refer
more patients to the centers. In the consent judgment, T2
agreed to pay the United States government $500,000 and to
change its business arrangements. The agreement received considerable publicity in the general press' 9 while the government
touted its "ground-breaking way of using the False Claims Act
...to provide a remedy for kickbacks in a civil context ....
"110
Thus, the trend is evident: a line of cases has emerged that
extends the reach of the FCA to include relatively straightforward situations of false billing, cases of false and inflated cost
reports, cases of false (but not inflated) cost reports, and more
exotic situations where a "tainted" transaction may be enough
to establish a false claim.
105.
106.

Id. at *2.
Id.

107.

See also, United States v. Northwestern Inst. of Psychiatry, No. 93-CV-0132

(E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 11, 1993) (pending case that alleges, among other things, that

kickback arrangements were grounds for a False Claims Act suit).
108. Ga. No. 1:94-CV-2549 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 1994).
109. See, e.g., George Anders, T2 Sets Accord in Fraud Case, To Pay Penalty:
Home-Infusion Firm's Pact is Likely To Be Viewed as Key U.S. Victory, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 26, 1994, at A2.
110. Novel Use of False Claims Act Arises in T2 Medicare Settlement, 3 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1418 (Oct. 20, 1994).
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Defendants may find some solace in several cases that seem
to not follow this trend. In United States v. Shaw,"' one of the
defendants was employed by land developers to prepare loan
applications for submission to the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). He pled guilty to bribing a FmHA official. In an
FCA suit, the government sought to collaterally estop the defendant from denying that each loan application prepared by
him was a false claim. However, the court rejected this argument, stating:
While the court would agree with the proposition that the loan
approval process was perhaps tainted by payment of the
bribes, the court does not accept the government's strained rationalization for its classification of these claims, the loan applications and preapplications, as false or fraudulent. The bare
fact that bribes were involved in this case, a fact established
conclusively by the prior criminal proceeding, does not necessarily lead to the further conclusion that false or fraudulent
claims were made in connection
with each of the loan applica112
tions or preapplications.
For this reason, the court denied the government's motion for
summary judgment on the FCA count. However, it seems clear
that while the court rejected the notion of a blanket "tainting"
of all transactions, the court would have accepted the government's argument as to any loan applications that were shown to
have been affected by the bribes.
In a similar vein, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals required
false statements in applications to be causally connected to the
damages suffered. 1 3 In that case, a real estate broker falsely
certified that certain houses were free of defects in plumbing,
electrical, and heating systems. Loans based on those misrepresentations were approved. Later, lead-based paint was forbidden in Philadelphia residences, making the subject houses
almost worthless. The district court found against the defendant
and awarded damages of approximately $120,000. However, the
court seemed to regret its decision, pointing out that
[t]he result is harsh indeed. For want of a few hundred dollars'
worth of work on each property, Hibbs has become, in effect,
the guarantor of mortgages amounting to close to $10,000
each, and is required to pay double the amounts the government has had to expend to make good on defaults which I
111.
112.
113.

725 F. Supp. 896 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
Id. at 900 (footnote omitted).
United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 1977).
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have found to be totally unrelated to the conditions for which
the certifications had issued. To make the result all the more
severe, at the time of the defaults these houses had virtually no
resale value due largely to a lead base paint condition of which
neither Hibbs
nor FHA was aware at the time the certifica114
issued.
tions
The Third Circuit .vacated the judgement, holding that the
damages should only have been based on the difference in value
between the houses as falsely represented and as they actually
were. 115 In other words, only damages that were actually caused
by the misrepresentation should have been awarded.
Although this case deals only with the damage provisions of
the FCA, and not with civil penalties, it is nevertheless useful in
supporting an argument that the government should be required
to show a connection between a kickback or other tainted arrangement and the alleged false claim.
Finally, the case of United States ex rel. Hughes v. Cook" 6 may
be of some value to defendants. In this case, the plaintiff
brought a qui tam action under the FCA against nine doctors,
claiming that all of their Medicaid claims had been false due to
various technical problems with the doctors' medical licensesthe doctors' licenses had lapsed. The court held that the doctors
were duly licensed. However, the court also stated that the doctors' technical lapses of their licensure would have been insufficient to form the basis for a suit under the FCA. It is important
to note that the court based its opinion on the older definition of
"knowing" violations of the act. With the newer "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" standards, the court's reasoning no longer applies. However, the case does represent at least
one instance in which a qui tam plaintiff tried and failed to turn
an entire series of transactions into false claims based on a defect in the doctors' practices.
B.

Stark Violations

Defendants are likely to find themselves fighting a rear-guard
action against the expansion of the FCA. In addition to the use
of the Act in enforcing the Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback
statute, the trend may spread to FCA suits based on violations
114.
115.
116.

420 F. Supp. 1365, 1373 (E.D. Pa. 1976), vacated, 568 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1977).
568 F.2d at 352.
498 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
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of the Stark self-referral prohibitions. 117 This law generally forbids Medicare or the federal portion of Medicaid to pay for
treatment that results from a physician's referral of a patient to
a provider of certain health services (for example, laboratory
services, medical supplies) when the referring physician (or a
relative) has a financial interest in the service provider.
Although no reported decisions deal with this issue, at least
one case points the way to such an expansion. In United States
v. Oakwood Downriver Medical Center,"8 the district court refused to dismiss an FCA suit brought by the government, holding that the 1986 amendments could be applied retroactively.
Although it was not addressed within the motion to dismiss, the
government's case was based on the defendant's failure to reveal dealings with related entities on its annual cost report.
Thus, although not directly dealing with the Stark prohibitions,
this case may open the door to future FCA suits based on violations of the self-referral ban. The analogy is clear: just as a medical center's failure to reveal dealings with related entities has
caused its cost report to be a false claim, so too, doctors' referrals to laboratories in which they have an interest could also be
deemed to create false claims when the federal government is
asked to pay for such services.
VI.

MANAGED CARE AND BEYOND

Looking farther ahead, as health care is increasingly provided
in managed care settings, the use of capitated payments can be
expected to remove the incentive to overutilize services, and,
perhaps, reduce the incidence of kickbacks and self-referrals.
However, as payment systems shift, so too will the incentives.
Providers who are compensated with capitated payments may
be tempted to curtail treatment or even fail to perform necessary services since providing those services will yield no additional compensation. If such a provider accepts capitated
payments from the federal government without performing required services, a False Claims Act violation would occur. Proving such a case might be difficult for the government or a qui
tam plaintiff since the case would involve a question of medical
judgment. It would be especially difficult to establish a case
where the patient's health was not adversely affected by the failure to perform services. However, in egregious situations or
117.
118.

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. 1993).
687 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
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where there are clear patterns of abuse, an increasing number of
such cases brought under the FCA is expected.
Beyond changes in the delivery of health care, the law affecting health care reimbursement may be changed, which could
open new territory to the reach of the FCA. Presently, the Act
applies only to claims made against the federal government, but
with some adjustments, many of its provisions could be expanded to cover claims presented to private health plans. If
prohibitions on kickbacks and self-referrals were also applied to
private payer settings, the opportunities to engage in such practices would be narrowed severely.
While the expansion of the False Claims Act into new areas
can be expected to further discourage health care fraud, such
expansion will also be accompanied by the same constitutional
problems discussed earlier. To the extent that civil damage
awards exceed any reasonable measure of actual losses, such
awards can only be regarded as punishment, and defendants will
face an increased risk of excessive fines and double jeopardy.
Certainly, the imaginations of United States attorneys and of
qui tam plaintiffs have not been exhausted, and even more creative uses of the False Claims Act can be anticipated. However,
the potential for abuse of defendants' rights cannot be ignored.
Courts will need to strive to protect constitutional rights and to
avoid frontier-style justice.
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